Original title: “Prolonged occupation and illegal Israeli colonization of the Palestinian territory: analysis of the recent ICJ advisory opinion”. Text written by Professor Nicolás Boeglin, from the Law School of the University of Costa Rica.


About two weeks ago, on July 12, 2024, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) indicated that it would release its advisory opinion (requested in December 2022 by the United Nations General Assembly) on Friday, July 19, 2024. In this regard, see the official press release issued by the ICJ (in French and English) on July 12.

A Small Preliminary Exercise

We invite our esteemed readers to review the reception of this press release in the major international and national media (either on July 12 or in the following days), in order to verify for themselves whether or not the scant circulation given to this announcement is an objective reality for any observer. Practically no announcement similar to that of the Al Jazeera channel on July 12 referring to this press release of the ICJ in The Hague was published in the European or North American press (see announcement on its X network – formerly Twitter of the same July 12).

Photo taken from press article published in Israel on August 31, 2023 by Magazine+972, entitled “‘It’s like 1948’: Israel cleanses vast West Bank region of nearly all Palestinians”. Full reading recommended.

What could be the reason for such reluctance to reply to an ICJ press release? Probably for the same reasons that explain the omission observed more recently. Regarding a joint letter from former Israeli military and intelligence chiefs dated July 23, addressed to several U.S. congressmen, in anticipation of the July 24 speech by the Prime Minister of Israel in person before the U.S. Congress in Washington (see letter). Or regarding a lengthy missive from volunteer doctors, surgeons and nurses dated July 25 to top U.S. officials about what they have witnessed in their humanitarian work in Gaza (see letter).

The network of support close to Israel that always seeks to minimize criticism of Israeli actions in the Palestinian territory in the world of information and communication (to which international news agencies do not escape, as will be seen in other parts of this text) would deserve to be analyzed by experts in communication. An example of a recent New York Times (NYT) headline on a new war crime in Gaza omitting to mention Israel (see note of the July 25 edition) is a clear example of this. (See the same headline with corrections provided that evidence the semantic maneuver of the NYT editorial staff in this link).

Let’s hope that at some point (given the large number of headlines about what is happening in Gaza in which there is a rarely observed effort from newsrooms and newscasts to minimize the scope of the incessant bombardment of Gaza’s civilian population by Israel for more than 9 months), communication experts will proceed to a detailed analysis of this real disinformation strategy in favor of Israel.

With regard to the United States, the repression against demonstrators on university campuses repudiating Israel’s crimes in Gaza has been such in recent months that United Nations human rights experts have issued a press release from UN headquarters in Europe on July 25 entitled “USA: Free speech on campus needs to be protected, not attacked, say experts” (see full text). The above exercise in relation to the ICJ press release of July 12 is expected to lead to a similar result with this press release.

Advisory Opinion In Summary

In its advisory opinion released this July 19 (see full text in English and full text in French), the ICJ forcefully concluded (see operative paragraph 285) that Israel’s prolonged occupation since 1967 is illegal and must be immediately suspended.

It should be noted that deliberations among the ICJ judges began on February 27, 2024, with the conclusion of the hearings at Peace Palace in The Hague the previous day (see verbatim of February 26, 2024, with the last oral presentations by the delegations of Spain, Fiji and the Maldives).

In addition, the ICJ stated that all new colonization activity must be suspended and that Israel is under an obligation to make reparation and compensate all natural or moral persons who have suffered the effects of its prolonged occupation and colonization of the Palestinian territory. The ICJ further stated that Israel must evacuate without further ado the Israeli settlers located in the occupied Palestinian territory.

For the ICJ, the other member states of the United Nations have the obligation not to recognize the legal effects of the illegal situation resulting from the illegal occupation of the occupied Palestinian territory, nor to provide any assistance to Israel to maintain it. Point 7 of paragraph 285 (for which 12 judges voted) should already be of concern to many States with which Israel maintains very close relations and whose products exported to Israel are used directly or indirectly to consolidate this illegal occupation and colonization.

The broad consensus among the judges of the ICJ in rendering this advisory opinion is more than evident. Of the 15 full ICJ judges (see current composition), there was only one dissenting opinion from its Vice-President (a judge from Uganda) (see text). This is not the first time that this member of the ICJ has diverged from the criteria of her counterparts when it comes to a matter involving Israel (as detailed in this note from the specialized site Justiceinfo of July 23, entitled “Who is Julia Sbutinde, the ICJ judge wha says ‘no’?”).

With regard to the other ICJ judges, it is very likely that Israel’s defiant attitude towards the ICJ judges since they issued a first order on January 26, 2024 (followed by two more), in the contentious case opposing South Africa to Israel, has created a certain indisposition in some of them.

Paragraph 285 Itself

So that our esteemed readers may judge for themselves the content of the ICJ’s conclusions, we permit us to reproduce the entirety of conclusive paragraph 285 and the 9 operative paragraphs it contains:

THE COURT, 
(1) Unanimously, 
Finds that it has jurisdiction to give the advisory opinion requested; 
(2) By fourteen votes to one, 
Decides to comply with the request for an advisory opinion; 
(3) By eleven votes to four, 
Is of the opinion that the State of Israel’s continued presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory is unlawful; 
(4) By eleven votes to four, 
Is of the opinion that the State of Israel is under an obligation to bring to an end its unlawful presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory as rapidly as possible; 
(5) By fourteen votes to one, 
Is of the opinion that the State of Israel is under an obligation to cease immediately all new settlement activities, and to evacuate all settlers from the Occupied Palestinian Territory; 
(6) By fourteen votes to one, 
Is of the opinion that the State of Israel has the obligation to make reparation for the damage caused to all the natural or legal persons concerned in the Occupied Palestinian Territory; 
(7) By twelve votes to three, 
Is of the opinion that all States are under an obligation not to recognize as legal the situation arising from the unlawful presence of the State of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by the continued presence of the State of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory; 
(8) By twelve votes to three, 
Is of the opinion that international organizations, including the United Nations, are under an obligation not to recognize as legal the situation arising from the unlawful presence of the State of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory; 
(9) By twelve votes to three, 
Is of the opinion that the United Nations, and especially the General Assembly, which requested this opinion, and the Security Council, should consider the precise modalities and further action required to bring to an end as rapidly as possible the unlawful presence of the State of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. 

LA COUR, 
1) À l’unanimité, 
Dit qu’elle a compétence pour donner l’avis consultatif demandé ; 
2) Par quatorze voix contre une, 
Décide de donner suite à la demande d’avis consultatif ; 
3) Par onze voix contre quatre, 
Est d’avis que la présence continue de l’État d’Israël dans le Territoire palestinien occupé est illicite ; 
4) Par onze voix contre quatre, 
Est d’avis que l’État d’Israël est dans l’obligation de mettre fin à sa présence illicite dans le Territoire palestinien occupé dans les plus brefs délais ; 
5) Par quatorze voix contre une, 
Est d’avis que l’État d’Israël est dans l’obligation de cesser immédiatement toute nouvelle activité de colonisation, et d’évacuer tous les colons du Territoire palestinien occupé ; 
6) Par quatorze voix contre une, 
Est d’avis que l’État d’Israël a l’obligation de réparer le préjudice causé à toutes les personnes physiques ou morales concernées dans le Territoire palestinien occupé ;
7) Par douze voix contre trois, 
Est d’avis que tous les États sont dans l’obligation de ne pas reconnaître comme licite la situation découlant de la présence illicite de l’État d’Israël dans le Territoire palestinien occupé et de ne pas prêter aide ou assistance au maintien de la situation créée par la présence continue de l’État d’Israël dans le Territoire palestinien occupé ; 
8) Par douze voix contre trois, 
Est d’avis que les organisations internationales, y compris l’Organisation des Nations Unies, sont dans l’obligation de ne pas reconnaître comme licite la situation découlant de la présence illicite de l’État d’Israël dans le Territoire palestinien occupé ;
9) Par douze voix contre trois, Est d’avis que l’Organisation des Nations Unies, et en particulier l’Assemblée générale, qui a sollicité le présent avis, et le Conseil de sécurité, doit examiner quelles modalités précises et mesures supplémentaires sont requises pour mettre fin dans les plus brefs délais à la présence illicite de l’État d’Israël dans le Territoire palestinien occupé.

This paragraph 285 concludes a long reflection by the ICJ on each of these nine points by analyzing the arguments of each party and then contrasting them with the available information as well as with the applicable international norms and international jurisprudence. A methodical and rigorous reflection, which extends over the preceding 284 paragraphs.

Some Points Of Detail

A full reading of the advisory opinion is recommended in order to observe the reasoning followed by the international judge in The Hague and the extreme care he has taken in analyzing the legal arguments of Israel and some of its allies before the ICJ during the public hearings held in February 2024. As will be seen below, most of these legal arguments were dismissed as legally invalid.

From a temporal point of view, it should be noted at the outset that the ICJ does not include in its reflections the events in Gaza since October 7, clarifying at the beginning of its opinion that the request was made by the General Assembly before that date:

81. The Court notes that the request for an advisory opinion was adopted by the General Assembly on 30 December 2022 and asked the Court to address Israel’s “ongoing” or “continuing” policies and practices (see resolution 77/247, twenty-eighth and twenty-ninth preambular paragraphs, and paragraph 18 (a)). Thus, the Court is of the view that the policies and practices contemplated by the request of the General Assembly do not include conduct by Israel in the Gaza Strip in response to the attack carried out against it by Hamas and other armed groups on 7 October 2023.

Desde este preciso punto de vista temporal, la lectura de los párrafos 93-94 cobra mayor relevancia, al hacer a un lado la CIJ el argumento defendido por Israel según el cual Israel no ocupa Gaza:

93. Based on the information before it, the Court considers that Israel remained capable of exercising, and continued to exercise, certain key elements of authority over the Gaza Strip, including control of the land, sea and air borders, restrictions on movement of people and goods, collection of import and export taxes, and military control over the buffer zone, despite the withdrawal of its military presence in 2005. This is even more so since 7 October 2023.

94. In light of the above, the Court is of the view that Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip has not entirely released it of its obligations under the law of occupation. Israel’s obligations have remained commensurate with the degree of its effective control over the Gaza Strip.

93. Au vu des informations dont elle dispose, la Cour considère qu’Israël avait conservé la faculté d’exercer, et continuait d’exercer, certaines prérogatives essentielles sur la bande de Gaza, notamment le contrôle des frontières terrestres, maritimes et aériennes, l’imposition de restrictions à la circulation des personnes et des marchandises, la perception des taxes à l’importation et à l’exportation, et le contrôle militaire sur la zone tampon, et ce, en dépit du fait que cet État a mis fin à sa présence militaire en 2005. Cela est encore plus vrai depuis le 7 octobre 2023.

94. Compte tenu de ce qui précède, la Cour est d’avis que le retrait d’Israël de la bande de Gaza n’a pas totalement libéré cet État des obligations que lui impose le droit de l’occupation. Les obligations d’Israël sont demeurées proportionnées au degré de son contrôle effectif sur la bande de Gaza.

With regard to the natural resources in the occupied Palestinian territory, which Israel controls and diverts for the exclusive use (or almost) of the Israeli colonies established in Palestinian territory, to the detriment of the Palestinian population, we read that:

133. On the basis of the evidence before it, the Court considers that Israel’s use of the natural resources in the Occupied Palestinian Territory is inconsistent with its obligations under international law. By diverting a large share of the natural resources to its own population, including settlers, Israel is in breach of its obligation to act as administrator and usufructuary. In this connection, the Court recalls that the transfer by Israel of its own population to the Occupied Palestinian Territory is contrary to international law (see paragraph 119 above). Therefore, in the Court’s view, the use of natural resources in the occupied territory cannot be justified with reference to the needs of that population. The Court further considers that, by severely restricting the access of the Palestinian population to water that is available in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Israel acts inconsistently with its obligation to ensure the availability of water in sufficient quantity and quality (Article 55 of the Fourth Geneva Convention).

133. Au vu des éléments de preuve dont elle dispose, la Cour considère que l’usage que fait Israël des ressources naturelles du Territoire palestinien occupé n’est pas conforme aux obligations que lui impose le droit international. En détournant une grande part des ressources naturelles au profit de sa propre population, notamment des colons, Israël manque à son obligation d’agir en tant qu’administrateur et usufruitier. À cet égard, la Cour rappelle que le transfert par Israël de sa propre population dans le Territoire palestinien occupé est contraire au droit international (voir le paragraphe 119 ci-dessus). Elle estime par conséquent que l’utilisation des ressources naturelles du territoire occupé ne peut être justifiée par les besoins de cette population. La Cour considère encore que, en restreignant gravement l’accès de la population palestinienne à l’eau disponible dans le Territoire palestinien occupé, Israël agit de manière contraire à l’obligation qu’il a d’assurer un approvisionnement en eau qui soit approprié sur le plan de la quantité autant que de la qualité (article 55 de la quatrième convention de Genève).

With regard to prolonged occupation and illegal colonization, accompanied by various practices on the part of Israel to extend its control, the ICJ is particularly blunt in paragraph 179, ruling that they amount to outright annexation:

179. The Court has found that Israel’s policies and practices amount to annexation of large parts of the Occupied Palestinian Territory. It is the view of the Court that to seek to acquire sovereignty over an occupied territory, as shown by the policies and practices adopted by Israel in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, is contrary to the prohibition of the use of force in international relations and its corollary principle of the non-acquisition of territory by force.

179. La Cour a conclu que les politiques et pratiques israéliennes équivalaient à l’annexion de vastes parties du Territoire palestinien occupé. Elle estime que le fait de tenter d’acquérir la souveraineté sur un territoire occupé, ainsi que cela ressort des politiques et pratiques adoptées par Israël à Jérusalem-Est et en Cisjordanie, est contraire à l’interdiction de l’emploi de la force dans les relations internationales et à son corollaire, le principe de non-acquisition de territoire par la force.

In paragraph 229, the ICJ concludes that the existing discrimination regime in Israel violates the provisions of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination by stating that:

229. La Cour observe que les lois et mesures d’Israël imposent et permettent de maintenir en Cisjordanie et à Jérusalem-Est une séparation quasi complète entre les communautés de colons et les communautés palestiniennes. Elle considère, pour cette raison, que les lois et mesures d’Israël emportent violation de l’article 3 de la CIEDR.

229. The Court observes that Israel’s legislation and measures impose and serve to maintain a near-complete separation in the West Bank and East Jerusalem between the settler and Palestinian communities. For this reason, the Court considers that Israel’s legislation and measures constitute a breach of Article 3 of CERD.

Note that for the South African ICJ judge, this ICJ conclusion implicitly recognizes the apartheid regime in force in Israel (see statement), despite the fact that the term as such is not used by the ICJ. In his individual statement, he reads that:

41. In the context of all of this, in my view, the Court was correct to find that the policies and practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory are in breach of the prohibition of racial segregation and apartheid in Article 3 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, a conclusion that implicitly recognizes the apartheid character of Israeli practices and policies in the OPT.

As for the legal consequences for Israel, the ICJ applies its now traditional jurisprudence to any international wrongful act of a State duly established and documented and declared as such by the ICJ, ruling emphatically in three paragraphs that are likely to give rise to very diverse initiatives, that:

268. The Court further observes that, with respect to the policies and practices of Israel referred to in question (a) which were found to be unlawful, Israel has an obligation to put an end to those unlawful acts. In this respect, Israel must immediately cease all new settlement activity. Israel also has an obligation to repeal all legislation and measures creating or maintaining the unlawful situation, including those which discriminate against the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, as well as all measures aimed at modifying the demographic composition of any parts of the territory. 

269. Israel is also under an obligation to provide full reparation for the damage caused by its internationally wrongful acts to all natural or legal persons concerned (see Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004 (I), p. 198, para. 152). The Court recalls that the essential principle is that “reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed” (Factory at Chorzów, Merits, Judgment No. 13, 1928, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 17, p. 47). Reparation includes restitution, compensation and/or satisfaction.

270. Restitution includes Israel’s obligation to return the land and other immovable property, as well as all assets seized from any natural or legal person since its occupation started in 1967, and all cultural property and assets taken from Palestinians and Palestinian institutions, including archives and documents. It also requires the evacuation of all settlers from existing settlements and the dismantling of the parts of the wall constructed by Israel that are situated in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, as well as allowing all Palestinians displaced during the occupation to return to their original place of residence.

268. La Cour observe en outre que, en ce qui concerne ses politiques et pratiques visées dans la question a), qui ont été jugées illicites, Israël est dans l’obligation de mettre un terme à ces faits illicites. À cet égard, il doit immédiatement cesser toute nouvelle activité de colonisation. Israël est également tenu d’abroger toutes lois et mesures créant ou maintenant la situation illicite, y compris celles qui sont discriminatoires à l’égard du peuple palestinien dans le Territoire palestinien occupé, ainsi que toutes mesures destinées à modifier la composition démographique de quelque partie de ce territoire.

269. Israël a également l’obligation de réparer intégralement les dommages causés par ses faits internationalement illicites à toutes les personnes physiques ou morales concernées (voir Conséquences juridiques de l’édification d’un mur dans le territoire palestinien occupé, avis consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 2004 (I), p. 198, par. 152). La Cour rappelle le principe essentiel selon lequel « la réparation doit, autant que possible, effacer toutes les conséquences de l’acte illicite et rétablir l’état qui aurait vraisemblablement existé si ledit acte n’avait pas été commis » (Usine de Chorzów, fond, arrêt no 13, 1928, C.P.J.I. série A no 17, p. 47). La réparation comprend la restitution, l’indemnisation ou la satisfaction.

270. La restitution inclut l’obligation pour Israël de restituer les terres et autres biens immobiliers, ainsi que l’ensemble des avoirs confisqués à toute personne physique ou morale depuis le début de son occupation en 1967, et tous biens et bâtiments culturels pris aux Palestiniens et à leurs institutions, y compris les archives et les documents. Elle exige également que tous les colons des colonies de peuplement existantes soient évacués, que les parties du mur construit par Israël qui sont situées dans le Territoire palestinien occupé soient démantelées, et que tous les Palestiniens déplacés durant l’occupation puissent retourner dans leur lieu de résidence initial.

In reality, there are many more legal aspects in which the ICJ clarifies the scope of international law in force in the face of Israel’s actions in the Palestinian territory it occupies.

In turn, the ICJ puts an end to endless debates between States, as well as between, on the one hand, NGOs, academics, specialists in public international law and, on the other hand, “experts”, commentators and analysts sympathetic to Israel and its circles of influence. Incidentally, several of the latter’s “arguments” can be easily refuted if one takes into account what the UN Security Council had already pointed out in December 2016 in resolution 2334 (see link). This resolution was adopted with 14 votes in favor and one abstention (United States).

ICJ Consultative Proceedings In Brief

As is well known, unlike a contentious procedure, the advisory procedure does not conclude with a judgment rendered to resolve a dispute between two States, but with a legal opinion of the international judge of a general nature.

However, in this case, the questions posed by the General Assembly were so formulated as to achieve what is contained in the aforementioned paragraph 285, calling upon Israel to comply with obligations deriving directly from public international law. The comparison between the two general questions put to the ICJ and the detailed manner of answering them indicates that the international judge considered it useful and appropriate to detail his answer in particularly key areas.

It should be recalled that, having received the request in January 2023, the ICJ first asked the 193 Member States of the United Nations and the various United Nations agencies to submit their legal opinions on the questions raised. Fifty-three States decided to submit their opinions, including Israel and Palestine.

In this regard, the 292 pages of the Palestinian brief (see text in French and in English) contrast with the modest 5 pages forwarded at the time by Israel. (See text in French and in English).

With respect to Israel, it should be noted that, although it could have done so, Israel chose not to participate in the oral hearings. A detail that the U.S. judge at the ICJ found it necessary to point out in her separate statement (see text), stating that:

4. It also is unfortunate that Israel did not meaningfully participate in these advisory proceedings. Israel submitted a five-page written statement to the Court, together with annexes. It chose not to participate in the oral proceedings, despite the fact that up to the opening of those proceedings, the Court had reserved three hours for Israel to present its views — the same amount of time allocated to the observer State of Palestine, and six times the amount allocated to any other participant. This is an advisory proceeding, and no State was under an obligation to participate, including Israel. Israel’s participation in the oral proceedings, however, would have benefited the Court. Conversely, the failure of a State to participate cannot prevent the Court from fulfilling its responsibilities in replying to an advisory request.

The fact that Israel considered that the defense of its legal arguments before international justice in The Hague merited no more than the submission of a 5-page brief to the ICJ deserves to be brought to light.

For their part, several Latin American States considered it appropriate to send their legal opinions to the ICJ (Note 1). The omission of many of the other 193 Member States of the United Nations was not verified in the case of the five permanent Member States of the United Nations Security Council, who sent their legal opinion to the judge in The Hague (Note 2).

We had had the opportunity to analyze the scope of the two questions posed by the United Nations General Assembly in a resolution, which led to two votes at the United Nations, first in November and then in December 2022, in two of our texts to which we refer our esteemed readers:

  • a) “Latin America before the request for an advisory opinion to international justice on the situation in Palestine: brief notes on the unusual vote against Costa Rica”, published on December 31, 2022, and available here. An expanded and updated version was published on the website of the University of Costa Rica (UCR) in February 2023 (available here).
  • b) “Palestine: occupation and colonization by Israel ready to be examined by the International Court of Justice (ICJ)”, edited on November 23, 2022, and available here. An expanded and updated version was published on the UCR website in December 2022 (available here). In this text we concluded that:

En sí misma, esta resolución constituye desde ya el primer peldaño de un procedimiento que permitirá, sin lugar a dudas, acercar un poco más la justicia internacional al drama humano que se vive desde muchos años en el territorio palestino ocupado, como consecuencia de una abierta, flagrante y reiterada violación a las reglas del ordenamiento jurídico internacional.

Costa Rica: A No Vote Without Any Explanation

The unusual vote against the aforementioned resolution of December 30, 2022 by Costa Rica (together with Guatemala in Latin America, being the only two States in Latin America to object to the request for an advisory opinion to the ICJ) has not given rise to any official explanation to date.

In the November 2022 vote, Costa Rica chose to abstain, without any explanation.

We again refer our esteemed readers to the voting board of December 30, 2022, which recorded a total of 98 votes in favor, 26 against and 53 abstentions. As well as to the text of resolution A/RES/77/247 itself, which is available here in Spanish.

The high number of abstentions (as well as the 27 States that opted for the “No Show”, one of them being Ukraine) are largely due to the intense diplomatic pressure exerted by Israel (and the United States) to prevent the resolution from being adopted at all costs.

Analysis of the recent ICJ advisory opinion on the prolonged illegal Israeli occupation and colonization of Palestinian territory.

With regard to Costa Rica, it was recently reported that the Municipality of Nicoya opted to withdraw from the official program an activity initially scheduled for July 24 in Nicoya, sponsored by the Embassy of Israel in Costa Rica, as part of the celebrations of the 200th anniversary of the annexation of Guanacaste (see note of July 10, 2024 from La Voz de Guanacaste).

In a forum organized at the University of Costa Rica (UCR) on July 4, entitled “Gaza / Israel: from the information siege to the siege of international justice” (see video), we had the opportunity to listen to a young student, a member of the Costa Rican Jewish community, denouncing the various crimes of Israel in Gaza. It is a courageous attitude, which contrasts markedly with that of the rest of the members of the Costa Rican Jewish community since October 7, 2023.

Israel Facing The Siege Of International Justice

Despite the unspeakable tragedy that has been unfolding in Gaza since the afternoon/evening of October 7, 2023, this advisory opinion of July 19, 2024 constitutes a new victory for Palestine before international justice and before the international community as such. Palestine succeeds, for the second time, that the ICJ, by means of an advisory opinion, establishes and declares the total illegality of Israel’s actions in the occupied Palestinian territory.

Indeed, the first advisory opinion took place in 2003-2004: the procedure culminated in the ICJ advisory opinion of July 9, 2004 on the legality of the wall built by Israel in the occupied Palestinian territory (see full text). That ICJ decision was taken internally within the ICJ with 14 votes in favor and one against (see operative paragraph 163). The American judge felt obliged to agree in part with some of Israel’s arguments and to separate himself from the criteria of his 14 counterparts in The Hague.

From a strictly legal perspective, and in the face of the legal justifications given by Israel following the October 7, 2023 attack perpetrated by Hamas, we find in paragraph 139 of said 2004 advisory opinion an aspect conveniently omitted by Israel, as well as by a large number of States close to Israel, and by editorialists, international analysts, and legal “experts” since October 7 (Note 3).

The fact that advisory opinions have no legally binding effect is a point that has been stressed by several international news agencies and national media in Israel since July 19 (and in national media in many other parts of the world). The assertion is part of those who seek to downplay the importance and minimize the scope of this ICJ decision.

This characteristic of an advisory opinion in no way detracts from the ICJ’s declaration of the illegality of the Israeli occupation and colonization. Rather, it is very likely that from now on:

  • this advisory opinion will guide the judges of the ICJ in their deliberations in the contentious cases involving Israel. We refer to South Africa’s claim against Israel on the basis of the 1948 genocide convention (filed in December 2024) and Nicaragua’s claim against Germany for complicity in genocide (filed in March 2024). On the numbers of people killed in Gaza since the afternoon/evening of October 7, note this extensive report by the NGO Airwars of July 24, the full reading of which is recommended;
  • This ICJ advisory opinion will have a similar effect on the judges not of the ICJ, but of the International Criminal Court (ICC), who must also rule on the request for arrest filed by the ICC Prosecutor against two Israeli and three Hamas leaders on May 20, 2024.

Not to mention the national judges of some States who have been requested by organizations to order the immediate cessation of arms exports and military equipment to Israel, and who will find in this advisory opinion an unparalleled support emanating from the highest jurisdictional instance in the United Nations organization chart.

Israel’s Impasse

For Israel, this second advisory opinion constitutes a new failure of its diplomacy, which deployed intense diplomatic efforts (with its staunch American ally) in the months of November/December 2022 so that this request for an advisory opinion would not be referred by the General Assembly to the ICJ.

It is very likely that this ICJ decision will provoke the usual angry reactions and gesticulations from Israel’s state apparatus, which no longer make much of an impression on anyone but a few circles.

On the other hand, Israeli civil society non-governmental organizations in Israel welcomed the ICJ’s decision. (See for example communiqué from B’tselem on July 19, and communiqué from Peace Now released on the same date).) A well-known lawyer and human rights activist in Israel did not hesitate to write in his article entitled “Why the ICJ ruling against Israel’occupation is a legal earthquake in slow motion”, published on July 23, that:

The special power of the law allows it sometimes to act like a trump card over the clogs created by political interests. The law, in its clarity and scope, is able in some cases to bring about an action, or prevent an action, that otherwise would be determined only by narrow political will, or the lack of it. In this case, international law’s position on Israel’s occupation, as declared by the ICJ, is a new and potent actor that joins politics, economics and military power, among others, in the matrix of forces that will determine the fate of this conflicto.

In France, one could read in a very comprehensive interview with a renowned and much sought-after jurist when it comes to understanding the legal scope of the conflict in Palestine (see interview published on July 25 in La Vie, and entitled “Johann Soufi: la CIJJ a rendu un avis historique pour la Palestine et le Proche Orient”), that:

C’est le caractère à la fois clair et puissant de l’avis qui est à retenir et qui m’a le plus surpris, venant d’une juridiction traditionnellement empreinte de réserve. Les juges de la Cour ont répondu, sans circonvolutions, à l’ensemble des questions posées par l’Assemblée générale des Nations unies, et à celles abordées lors des plaidoiries de février 2024.

It is noteworthy that some international news agencies have shown their creativity in downplaying the content of this advisory opinion, with semantic feats that we personally have rarely seen before. Among many, we can cite the title of this cable from the EFE news agency entitled “The International Court of Justice believes that Israeli settlements in Palestine violate the law” disseminated on the same July 19. The ICJ, the highest jurisdictional instance within the United Nations, “believes”? How so? As it reads. And there, unlike what was pointed out in the first lines of these reflections with an ICJ press release that went practically unnoticed, this semantic game of the EFE agency was replicated in the headlines of a multitude of national and international media.

In Conclusion

It should be noted that the arguments put forward by Israel before the ICJ judges, as well as by a small group of States (Canada, Czech Republic, Fiji, Guatemala, Hungary, Nauru, United Kingdom, United States and Zambia – Note 4) did not have much effect among the ICJ judges: in effect, the judges declared themselves perfectly competent to examine and answer the two questions, and took the majority of the 9 points contained in paragraph 285 with 12 or 14 votes in favor (point 4 being the only one on which the decision was taken in a slightly more divided manner, with 11 votes in favor and 4 against).

For the time being, in addition to the strong signal that the ICJ sends to the other UN Member States, several of them immediately echoed the call of the international judge in The Hague: among many others, we can cite Spain (see official communiqué), Slovenia (see communiqué) or Turkey (see official communiqué).

In Latin America, we can refer to the communiqués published by the diplomatic apparatus of Bolivia (see official communiqué), Brazil (see official communiqué), Chile (see official communiqué) and Colombia (see communiqué). The communiqué of the European Union (EU) also deserves mention (see text).

Our esteemed readers and colleagues of Anglo-Saxon culture will be able to compare the terse text released by the United Kingdom (see text) and compare the latter with the extensive communiqué released by the Irish diplomacy (see communiqué) or with that of South Africa (see official communiqué). It can also be compared – although no knowledge of English is necessary – with the official silence of the diplomatic apparatuses of the United States and Canada.

Text shared by Nicolás Boeglin, Professor of Public International Law, School of Law, University of Costa Rica (UCR). Contact: [email protected]


Notes

Note 1: From the Latin American side, Bolivia (see text in French and English) sent its views to the ICJ (in addition to Belize, Canada, the United States and Guyana in the American hemisphere) on 25 July 2023; Brazil (see text in French and in English) on July 25, 2023; Colombia (see text in French and in English) on July 25, 2023, as well as on the same date; Cuba (see text in French and in English); Guatemala (see text in French and in English) on October 23, 2023, and Chile (see text in French and in English) on October 25, 2023. The complete reading of these documents allows to know in detail the various arguments that each of these Latin American States considered appropriate to send to the international judge in The Hague in order to assist him in his deliberations.

Note 2: The legal opinions of these five States can be consulted, starting (in alphabetical order) with the one submitted by China (see text in French and in English), by the United States (see text in French and in English), by France (see text in French and in English), by the United Kingdom (see text in French and in English) and by Russia (see text in French and in English).

Note 3: In fact, in this paragraph 139, the ICJ mentioned in July 2004 that the self-defense provided for in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations cannot be invoked by Israel when reacting to attacks emanating from the Palestinian territory it occupies:

L’article 51 de la Charte reconnaît ainsi l’existence d’un droit naturel de légitime défense en cas d’agression armée par un Etat contre un autre Etat. Toutefois, Israël ne prétend pas que les violences dont il est victime soient imputables à un Etat étranger. La Cour note par ailleurs qu’Israël exerce son contrôle sur le territoire palestinien occupé et que, comme Israël l’indique lui-même, la menace qu’il invoque pour justifier la construction du mur trouve son origine à l’intérieur de ce territoire, et non en dehors de celui-ci. Cette situation est donc différente de celle envisagée par les résolutions 1368 (2001) et 1373 (2001) du Conseil de sécurité, et de ce fait Israël ne saurait en tout état de cause invoquer ces résolutions au soutien de sa prétention à exercer un droit de légitime défense. En conséquence, la Cour conclut que l’article 51 de la Charte est sans pertinence au cas particulier.

Article 51 of the Charter thus recognizes the existence of an inherent right of self-defence in the case of armed attack by one State against another State. However, Israel does not claim that the attacks against it are imputable to a foreign State. The Court also riotes that Israel exercises control in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and that, as Israel itself states, the threat which it regards as justifying the construction of the wall originates within, and not outside, that teriritory. The situation is thus different from that contemplated by Securi1.y Council resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (200 l), and therefore lsrael could not in any event invoke those resolutions in support of its claim to be exercising a right of self-defence. Consequently, the Court concludes that Article 51 of the Charter has no relevance in this case.

Note 4: The case of Zambia deserves a particular mention, having voted in favor of the request for an advisory opinion in December 2022 at the United Nations General Assembly. In its brief sent to the ICJ on August 4, 2023, consisting of only one page (see version in French and in English), it reads that:

At the outset, the Republic of Zambia wishes to inform the Court that, although it had earlier joined the Africa Group in support of Resolution 77/247, the Republic of Zambia has decided to withdraw its support concerning the request made therein for an advisory opinion of the Court.

Avant toute chose, la République de Zambie tient à faire connaître à la Cour que, bien qu’elle se soit précédemment ralliée au groupe africain pour appuyer la résolution 77/247, elle a décidé de retirer ce soutien pour ce qui concerne la demande d’avis consultatif qui y est formulée à l’adresse de la Cour.

It would be of great interest to know what could have caused such a sudden change in Zambia’s position.