Gaza / Israel: regarding the request for intervention presented by Belize before the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
Gaza / Israel: regarding the request for intervention presented by Belize before the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
Nicolas Boeglin, Professor of Public International Law, Faculty of Law, University of Costa Rica (UCR). Contact: nboeglin(a)gmail.com
“Lo que está ocurriendo en Gaza no es una operación militar, es una agresión a gran escala contra nuestro pueblo. Son masacres contra civiles inocentes. Nada en el derecho natural ni en el derecho internacional permite atacar a civiles y perpetrar contra ellos ataques tan indiscriminados y bárbaros / What is happening in Gaza is not a military operation, it is a full-scale assault against our people. It is massacres against innocent civilians. Nothing in natural law or international law allows for the targeting of civilians and such indiscriminate, barbaric attacks against them” . Intervención del representante de Palestina ante el Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas, en su sesión del 16 de octubre del 2023 (véase acta S/PV/9439, en página 9) / Statement by the representative of Palestine to the United Nations Security Council, at its meeting on 16 October 2023 (see verbatim S/PV/9439, at page 9)
As an introduction
On January 30, Belize formally requested international justice to intervene in support of South Africa’s lawsuit against Israel filed on December 30, 2023 for genocide in text of the request for intervention). Previously, Cuba made a similar request (January 10), as did Ireland (January 6), bringing to three the number of states in the month of January 2025 alone that have submitted requests for intervention to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague in support of the South African lawsuit against Israel: a previously unobserved occurrence in the history of international justice for states not party to a dispute.
It is possible that these three requests are related to the discursive drift of the new occupant of the White House in his staunch defense of Israel during the US electoral contest, and that he seems to want to materialize from his official entry into office on January 20, accompanying this drift of senseless and extremely dangerous statements.
It should be remembered that Belize chose to break all official relations with Israel in November 2023, preceded by Bolivia (October 2023), and followed by Colombia (May 2024): three decisions taken in repudiation of Israel’s disproportionate and indiscriminate military actions in Gaza against Palestinian civilians that began on the evening of October 7, 2023. In this
This is the first time that Belize has filed a request of this nature in an ICJ dispute. And it is the third time in its existence as a State that Belize has appeared in a contentious case, its first experience being the joint request made with Guatemala for border delimitation in 2008 (see text), both pending resolution.
This February 4th, this time within the framework of the advisory procedure, the ICJ authorized the Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to participate in the proceedings initiated in December 2024 on Israel’s obligations as a United Nations Member State with respect to the United Nations humanitarian agencies working in the occupied Palestinian territory and with Palestinian refugees since 1947 (see ICJ press release at s). On February 7, the League of Arab States was also authorized by the ICJ to participate in these proceedings (see the official ICJ communiqué at és).
Some recent occurrences in the United States
On February 7, another international court in The Hague, the International Criminal Court (ICC), rejected the sanctions against it adopted by the United States on the same date for investigating Israel and its military actions in Gaza since the evening of October 7 (see official statement).
This is an unprecedented measure against ICC personnel that shows the total loss of credibility of the United States in matters of international criminal justice, as denounced by Amnesty International in its statement, in which it states that “The US government’s decision to impose sanctions on the ICC is a serious blow to the international criminal justice system. The US government’s decision to impose sanctions on the ICC is a serious blow to the international criminal justice system. org/en/latest/news/2025/02/usa-sanctions-against-international-criminal-court-betray-international-justice-system/“>statement, as did Human Rights Watch (HRW) in another press release. Indeed, since 1945, the international community has always sought to establish mechanisms that allow those responsible for serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law to be held accountable for their actions from an individual criminal point of view: the United States considers that, in the case of Israel, this founding principle of the United Nations and of international human rights law and international humanitarian law should no longer apply.
A large group of States rejected these sanctions in a statement that can be read at this link of Spanish diplomacy. Hungary and the Czech Republic do not appear in this group. On the Latin American side, Argentina, Ecuador, El Salvador and Paraguay do not appear in this group, and in the following lines we will explain the reasons why Argentina and Paraguay are silent and distant from other States when it comes to Israel, not without already hinting that the relations between Israel and El Salvador and between Israel and Ecuador both deserve a detailed investigation.
The decision to sanction ICC personnel for investigating and seeking to prosecute two senior Israeli officials should come as no surprise, nor should the fact that the United States will, as of January 20, 2025, use all means at its disposal to isolate South Africa and sanction it with a single purpose: the withdrawal of the lawsuit filed before the ICJ against Israel in December 2023.
Ceasefire between Israel and Hamas and international justice
For our esteemed readers who are following the evolution of the situation in Gaza in the light of the different rules that prevail in public international law, it is appropriate to point out a few things regarding the ceasefire announced on January 15th between Israel and Hamas. It should be noted from the outset that this provisional ceasefire in no way affects the legal actions brought against Israel before various judicial bodies.
Negotiated between Israel and Hamas, this agreement was put into effect with the first exchange of three Israeli hostages and 90 Palestinian prisoners, in the presence of representatives and vehicles of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and constitutes an important truce reached by Israel and Hamas, thanks to the mediation of Qatar, Egypt and the United States: both for Palestinian families in Gaza, bombarded incessantly since the evening of October 7, 2023, and for Israeli society, which can finally reunite families with their loved ones after an exhausting wait. A second exchange of this kind took place on the weekend of January 25/26, a third on the weekend of February 1/2, 2025, a fourth this weekend of the 8/9, and more will follow if this truce is not broken. Incidentally, this momentary truce should also lead us, as Israeli society, to reflect on the very peculiar way in which its highest authorities responded to the attack suffered on October 7, 2023. The report on Gaza produced by the United Nations on January 28, 2025, gives an account and details of what has allowed the ceasefire with respect to these exchanges between Israeli hostages and Palestinian prisoners.
The images in this report published on January 23 in Israel by Magazine+972 (which we recommend reading in full), give an account of the desolation of many displaced Palestinian families inside Gaza as they return to what were their neighborhoods, totally destroyed or disfigured, taking advantage of the truce in the Israeli bombings, effective since January 19, 2025 at 11:15.
With the massive influx of humanitarian aid and the temporary relief it means for the 2.3 million people in Gaza who have been deprived of all basic necessities for many long months (water, food, medicine, clothing and tents to protect them from the cold in the case of displaced persons), it is also hoped that human rights organizations and teams of international investigators can take advantage of this cessation of hostilities, which should last for 42 days (corresponding to phase I of the agreement between Israel and Hamas) to document events and recover testimonies of the genocide taking place in Gaza, the subject of South Africa’s lawsuit against Israel. This is precisely what can be read in this joint statement of January 20, 2025, human rights experts on torture, which received very little coverage in the major international media. In its press release welcoming the ceasefire of January 15, 2025, Amnesty International did not hesitate to state that: > press release In welcoming the ceasefire of January 15, 2025, Amnesty International did not hesitate to state that:
The international community which has thus far shamefully failed to persuade Israel to comply with its legal obligations must ensure Israel immediately allows lifesaving supplies to urgently reach all parts of the occupied Gaza Strip to ensure the survival of the Palestinian population. This includes guaranteeing the entry of vital medical supplies to treat the wounded and sick and facilitating urgent repairs to medical facilities and other vital infrastructure. Unless Israel’s illegal blockade of Gaza is promptly lifted, this suffering will only continue. They must also urgently grant access to independent human rights monitors into Gaza to uncover evidence and reveal the extent of violations.
Despite figures on fatalities in Gaza provided by the Gaza health authorities and the United Nations over the last 15 months, it is very likely that the final balance is an underestimate: for a well-known French author, a former soldier in the military who is much in demand in the French press, having been in charge of carrying out bombings and evaluating their impact when he was in the military, we read in his latest article on his website ‘Ne pas Subir’ that the death toll in Gaza actually exceeds 100,000 victims;
Un cessez-le-feu après plus de 100,000 bombardements contre Gaza
Cet accord constitue en premier lieu un immense soulagement après 15 mois de guerre déclenchée par l’attaque terroriste du Hamas le 7 octobre 2023 contre Israël (1,400 morts et disparus). Un immense soulagement après plus de 100,000 bombardements décidés par Benyamin Netanyahou contre la bande de Gaza et qui ont fait un nombre au moins équivalent de morts et 3,5 fois plus de blessés, soit de l’ordre de 500,000 victimes, blessés et décédés parmi les Palestiniens”.
According to this this interview with RFI in May 2024, and in another October article in FranceInfo, this French expert already explained in some detail the limitations of all kinds of death records made by the health authorities in Gaza, which only record clearly identified bodies found, leaving out unidentified bodies or bodies lying under rubble that no rescue team can access. Precisely in this
On a retrouvé des corps dans les rues, abandonnés depuis des mois. Mais qu’en est-il de ceux toujours sous les décombres ? Comment revivre dans ces lieux en sachant que les corps des vôtres sont là, sous vos pieds ? Jusque-là, à Rafah, on a déterré près de 200 dépouilles à l’état de squelettes. Et ce n’est qu’un début. Les recherches sont difficiles, elles doivent être menées avec délicatesse. Il faut des opérateurs de bulldozers capables de chercher les corps sans les écraser. Ces squelettes éparpillés dans les rues ou enfermés dans les ruines, c’est pour les Gazaouis un choc encore plus grand que la guerre. Nous vivions dans une tornade, un mixeur qui tourne et qui tourne. Le mixeur s’est arrêté. Et il nous laisse coupés en morceaux. Il n’y a plus de vie. Des gens essaient de se motiver pour nettoyer un peu. Le gouvernement du Hamas a commencé à dégager les routes, à pomper de l’eau, sa police s’est déployée dans les marchés, s’occupe de la circulation. Mais ce n’est pas du tout suffisant.
In the aforementioned United Nations report on Gaza dated January 28, 2025, we can read that:
Between the afternoons of 22 January and 28 January, the Ministry of Health (MoH) in Gaza reported that 193 Palestinians were killed and 397 were injured. This includes 171 bodies retrieved across the Gaza Strip. Since the ceasefire came into effect on 19 January, and as of 28 January, a total of 354 bodies were retrieved from areas that were previously inaccessible, MoH reported
Equally interesting is this report by the channel AlJazeera on January 24 about various educational initiatives that take advantage of the absence of bombings in Gaza to return children to the classroom: rebuilding the traumatized minds of young people after 15 months of incessant bombing is quite a challenge, one that Palestinian teachers and international volunteers are willing to face.
The context of Belize’s request for intervention
Before going into detail about the action brought by Belize at the end of January 2025, it is worth recalling that South Africa chose to take Israel to the International Court of Justice in The Hague in December 2023, after observing the United States exercising its right to veto in the United Nations Security Council (see official note from the United Nations): this US veto on December 8 prevented the adoption of a resolution that had been proposed and extensively negotiated by the United Arab Emirates, demanding a ceasefire and the entry of humanitarian aid into Gaza.
That vote recorded 13 votes in favor, one abstention (United Kingdom) and the solitary veto of the United States: see the official United Nations press release of December 8 and this press release. On December 22, 2023, the United States did not oppose a very similar resolution, but in which the operative paragraph on a ceasefire was … discarded (Note 1).
It was after observing these American maneuvers within the Security Council that South Africa filed its lawsuit against Israel for genocide in Gaza with the ICJ on December 29, 2023. And it is within the framework of this contentious lawsuit filed by South Africa against Israel that, on January 30, 2025, Belize formally submitted a formal request for intervention to the ICJ: see the official ICJ communiqués of January 31, 2025 in French and in English. org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20250131-pre-01-00-fr.pdf“>French and English.
Notice, as an interesting fact, scarcely disseminated in some international press media, that the terms of the ceasefire agreement reached on January 15, 2025 are practically identical to the one proposed in December 2023, according to one of the mediators, Qatar, outraged by so much lost time (see article in the JerusalemPost).
Photo of Palestinian families returning to their neighborhoods on January 19, 2025, published in the reportaje del 23 de enero del 2025 de Magazine+972, titulado My neighborhood was one of the most beautiful in Gaza. All that´s left is rubble.
Some brief details about Belize’s request for intervention
In their request for intervention, which was sent in English on January 30, 2025 (see text), Belize proceeds to present its arguments regarding the interpretation it considers should be given to some of the main provisions of the 1948 Genocide Convention.
Remember that, negotiated and adopted in 1948, the terms and formulations found in this convention should be interpreted in the light of the evolution of public international law since 1945, in the interest of better protecting a group or a specific population that is the victim of an attempt to exterminate it, as well as preventing new acts perpetrated with the same objective.
Belize, as a State Party to the 1948 Genocide Convention, is seeking to make the ICJ judges aware that they should also be guided by interpretations that best respond to the spirit of the Convention. The request is based on Article 63, paragraph 2 of the ICJ Statute, a provision that reads as follows:
Article 63:
- When the interpretation of a convention involves States other than the parties to the dispute, the Secretary shall immediately notify all the States concerned.
- “Every State so notified shall have the right to intervene in the proceedings; but if it exercises that right, the interpretation contained in the judgment will be equally binding on it.”
As the 1948 Genocide Convention is a convention that has 153 States Parties (see official status of signatures and ratifications), there are 151 remaining States (in addition to Belize and Israel) that could request this type of intervention before the ICJ judge. We will see in the following lines that it is a small and reduced group of States that have decided to support the South African lawsuit formally filed in the last days of 2023, which Belize has joined since January 30th.
On the other hand, it should be emphasized that Belize resorts to invoking another provision of the ICJ Statute in its brief, Article 62, which reads as follows:
Article 62
- If a State considers that it has an interest of a legal nature which may be affected by the decision in the case, it may request the permission of the Court to intervene.
- “The Court will decide on this petition.”
Belize’s position, invoking Article 62 of the ICJ Statute, seeks to take to its logical conclusion the idea that the prohibition of genocide is a peremptory norm of public international law (also known as a “rule of jus cogens” according to Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties): if all States must, logically, have a legal interest in ensuring that this prohibition is respected and that the obligation to prevent genocide is considered a peremptory norm of obligatory compliance for all States, regardless of the conventional framework, the judge must be able to accept a request to intervene of this nature.
The precedent for an application based on both provisions (62 and 63, paragraph 2) is found in the application submitted by Palestine to intervene in this same case of the South African lawsuit against Israel, filed on June 3, 2024.
Brief contextualization based on recent data
In an interview with one of the leading specialists on genocide (see interview conducted by Democracy Now) released on December 30, 2024 and titled “Total Moral, Ethical Failure”: Holocaust Scholar Omer Bartov on Israel’s Genocide in Gaza”, the specialist confirms the urgent need to stop Israel’s genocidal momentum in Gaza.
From within Israel itself, a historian has collected and compiled a wide range of data on the various exactions to which the Israeli military forces in Gaza have been subjected since the evening of October 7, 2023 (see
At the level of the United Nations, it should be noted that on December 30, 2024, a large group of United Nations human rights experts demanded that Israel be held accountable for all violations committed in Gaza under existing international law (see joint statement). On December 31, 2024, a United Nations report was also released on the systematic and deliberate nature of Israel’s attacks on hospitals and medical centers in Gaza (see official statement from the United Nations with a link to the report itself): in this regard, the lack of dissemination in the major international media of these two press releases issued by the United Nations during the last days of 2024 is more than noticeable.
This alert issued by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) on January 3 about the dramatic effects of rain and low temperatures on the displaced population in Gaza taking refuge in makeshift camps and exposed to the elements.
I also reject attempts to conflate all criticism of Israeli government policies and military operations with antisemitism. It is not antisemitic, for example, to deplore military operations that raise grave concerns over violations of international humanitarian and human rights law. Nor is it antisemitic to condemn those violations and urge respect for the law – including the decisions of international courts . Nor is it antisemitic to call Israel to account for the tens of thousands of people in Gaza, including more than 250 of our own UN staff, who have been killed since 7 October 2023.
As a complement to the latest United Nations reports on the situation in Gaza (report as of January 22, 2025, report as of January 14, 2025, https://www. org/content/humanitarian-situation-update-255-gaza-strip“>report as of January 14, 2025, report as of January 8, 2025 and report as of December 31, 2024) detailing the intensity of Israel’s bombing of Gaza in the last days of 2024 and the first three weeks of 2025, while much of the world was celebrating Christmas and the arrival of 2025, it is also recommended:
- this recent interview (Al Jazeera, January 6, 2024): with several internationally renowned experts, this broadcast deals with the medium- and long-term effects on human health of the particles inhaled by survivors of massive bombings in highly populated areas such as Gaza. These are health effects that in the past were observed in the bodies of people living in cities in Iraq and Syria, and that in 2024, in addition to Gaza, threaten the health of people living in urban centers in Lebanon in the face of the intensity of the bombings by Israel that began in mid-September 2024;
- this report by a Palestinian NGO entitled ”How to hide a genocide: the role of evacuation orders and safe zones in Israel’s genocidal campaign in Gaza” which explains the strategy behind Israel’s repeated bombings of refugee and displaced persons camps in Gaza.
According to the third to last report from the United Nations (report as of January 8, 2025) regarding the critical situation of children in Gaza, it is indicated that:
On 6 January, MoH announced the death of a 35-day old baby due to the cold and lack of warm shelter in Gaza, adding that this had brought the total number of deaths due to hypothermia to eight across the Strip. MSF reports that, between October and December 2024, the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (NICU) of the Nasser Medical Complex in Khan Younis had admitted 325 infants, with MSF teams embedded in the unit treating “newborns and premature babies with potentially life-threatening respiratory infections, dehydration, and other complications.” According to Dr. Mohammed Abu Tayyem, a pediatrician at Nasser, the pediatric ward is seeing an increased number of children with acute bronchiolitis, pneumonia, upper respiratory tract infections and even bronchial asthma exacerbations. The doctor attributes these rising cases to the harsh winter weather, dire conditions in tents and limited heating supplies, all of which render premature and low-birth-weight babies more vulnerable to hypothermia. Commenting on the death of at least seven newborns due to hypothermia in December, the WHO Director-General warned that “more children are in danger,” and that, while “every child deserves a healthy and safe start in life… the children of Gaza are paying the price of war with their own lives.
The Israeli army: some recent data that has hardly been disclosed
The fact that on January 2, 2025, Israel revised upwards the number of its casualties in Gaza (totaling 891) which includes 38 suicides among its military forces is of interest (see article by Haaretz).
The increase is quite significant when compared to the figure of 393 military casualties recorded in the United Nations report on Gaza as of December 31, 2024, a figure obtained from official Israeli data (see report).
Regarding suicides, and more generally the mental health of Israeli soldiers sent to Gaza, in October 2024 this report by CNN showed the kind of trauma suffered by many reservists returning from Gaza. In 2017, this report by the Israeli digital media outlet Magazine+972 – which we recommend reading in full – stated that:
According to a study conducted by Major Leah Shelef, who heads the Israeli Air Force’s Mental Health Clinic, 2009 saw 188 suicide attempts — a third of them by women. Am I included in those 188 attempts? According to statistics published in Haaretz, from 2007 until 2013, 124 soldiers committed suicide during their army service, while 237 soldiers committed suicide between 2002-2012. Even worse, between 2009 and 2011, the main cause of death among soldiers was suicide.
No harm can be done by pointing out this voluminous compilation of testimonies from Israeli soldiers who participated in the deadly military ground offensive in Gaza in the summer of 2014, produced by the organization Breaking the Silence in Israel (242 pages). This is an exercise preceded by another similar compilation (112 pages) in relation to the equally deadly military offensive in Gaza in 2009: in both compilations, the type of testimony is evident. pdf”>compilation (112 pages) relating to the equally deadly military offensive in Gaza in 2009: in both compilations, the type of instructions received by these young Israelis and the trauma of having to carry them out without much prior preparation is evident.
Finally, it is worth noting that official statistics released on December 31, 2024, by the Israeli authorities indicate that during 2024, more than 82,600 Israeli citizens have decided to travel abroad and not return (see note from the TimesofIsrael on the same date), without specifying in this note whether or not these are people of an age to be called up by the Israeli army in Gaza: in September 2024, the rather peculiar way in which the current Israeli authorities plan to resolve the lack of combatants in Gaza was reported (see article by France24).
On January 15, 2025, this statement by the then head of US diplomacy exposed the failure of Israel’s strategy in Gaza from a strictly military perspective: see article in the Times of Israel entitled ‘Blinken: we assess that Hamas has recruited almost as many new fighters as it has lost’. Our esteemed readers will be able to see for themselves the poor dissemination in the major international media of this statement by the outgoing Secretary of State, made public in his last days as head of US diplomacy: had it been made public much earlier it would possibly have moved the United States to review its position, given that from the beginning of Israel’s military operation in Gaza there were several voices warning that Hamas would be strengthened with each indiscriminate and disproportionate attack by Israel against the Palestinian civilian population. It should also be noted that sympathy for the fighters of the military wing of Hamas has been growing in another Palestinian territory occupied by Israel: the West Bank. This is largely due to the disproportionate response initiated on the evening of October 7, 2023 by Israel in Gaza. It should be noted that it was not until January 24, 2025, that an international news agency referenced an estimated figure from the United States on the recruitment carried out by Hamas in Gaza (see Reuters cable): the time taken to make this data public raises very valid questions and there is still doubt, given this date, as to why nothing was ever aired during the time that Donald Trump’s predecessor held the presidency of the United States.
With the ceasefire announced on January 15th coming into effect on January 19th at 11:15 and the release by Hamas of Israeli hostages in their possession, the Israeli military strategy of the last 15 months can be considered a resounding failure: This is because, since the evening of October 7, 2023, its top authorities have argued that its military operation in Gaza had two military objectives, namely to free the hostages and to “annihilate Hamas.”
Vacationing after having committed crimes in Gaza: recent experiences observed in Brazil and Chile
Thousands of kilometers from Gaza, in Brazil, on the first weekend of 2025, an Israeli soldier suspected of committing war crimes made an incredible last-minute escape from an arrest warrant issued by the Brazilian justice system, thanks to the efforts of Israeli diplomats in Brazil, the details of which have not been disclosed.
Normally, an arrest warrant is served on the airport and immigration authorities and in this particular case, the person concerned managed to evade the controls by leaving Brazilian territory on the first available commercial flight. How did he manage it? We don’t know, and for some reason the press has not shown any curiosity in the matter. In this report from CNN it is indicated that the Israeli authorities are going to order the concealment of the true identity of their nationals when they are called upon to give interviews in order to avoid this type of problem in the future: This announcement does not affect the numerous lawsuits filed against Israeli officers and soldiers based on thousands of photographs and videos posted by commanders and officers on social networks, apparently posing proudly for photos of their actions against the Palestinian civilian population.
In this article in the New York Times on January 9, it is indicated that it is very likely that this case detected in Brazil is not an isolated case, but that many other similar cases will be observed in the future:
Unlike more senior leaders, lower-level soldiers do not usually have diplomatic immunity, or the resources to research which jurisdictions may leave them vulnerable to war crimes complaints.
IDF reservists who fought in Gaza are being advised to first check with the Foreign Ministry regarding the level of danger in any country they wish to visit.
Otherwise, article from the TimesofIsrael dated January 15, 2025, it seems that Italy is no longer a ‘safe’ destination. In this other article from November 2024 from YNetnews, it seems that Cyprus is not a “safe” destination either. In this article from the Timesof Israel, dated January 28, 2025, New Zealand has adopted rules that may inspire other states regarding the entry into their territory of Israeli reservists who have fought in Gaza.
The sudden complication of what appeared to be his vacation in Latin America was also suffered by an Israeli soldier who was in the extreme south of Chile and who has been the subject of an action by several NGOs in the Chilean courts (see report by Radio UChile on December 28). Greater care would be expected from the Chilean airport and immigration authorities, from the airlines accredited at Chilean airports, and from the Chilean border police, so that what was observed in Brazil on January 5, 2025, cannot be repeated.
Note that this type of legal action in national courts has also been brought before European courts, especially in the case of Israeli soldiers holding a European passport in addition to their Israeli passport and suspected of having committed war crimes in Gaza.
Costa Rica: some things observed on some beaches… and other things too
In the case of Costa Rica, in March 2024, a report on Costa Rican television (see
And while we’re at it, we’ll throw in a few clues as to what might have motivated the surprising mention of Costa Rica and Iran in the same sentence by the Prime Minister of Israel on one of his trips to the United States in 2017 (see article in La Nación: ”We talk about Costa Rica or Iran” (sic.) and article in the Tico Times). To date, there is no known explanation for such a strange analogy between Iran and Costa Rica in the mind of the current Prime Minister of Israel.
As well as the aforementioned Santa Teresa beach in Cóbano, where an Israeli man was apparently killed by other Israelis in April 2021 (see news item from 2021 in DiarioExtra), there are several other beaches that are very successful as tourist destinations in Israel. At the time of writing, no news has emerged regarding any legal action similar to those seen in Brazil and Chile by any Costa Rican judicial authority.
Note that the Costa Rican press reported on a soldier in Gaza with a Costa Rican passport (see Teletica news item from November 2024), without providing further details about the type of operations in which he has been involved.
The data previously found in the Costa Rican press can be usefully supplemented with other facts recorded at the United Nations and with recent public announcements by the highest Costa Rican authorities.
a) the positions of Costa Rica in the United Nations (2022-2024)
For our esteemed readers in Costa Rica, it is worth recalling that when the United Nations General Assembly accepted the advisory opinion issued on July 19, 2024, in the vote on a resolution (see Canada. Or in Europe, the delegation of Germany as well as that of Netherlands.
Said in other words, “Do you abstain? Explain yourself” is what is expected of a delegate at the United Nations: in effect, as is well known, when voting for or against a text (or abstaining), a representative of a State has the opportunity to explain to the other delegations what motivated their State’s position (what is known in diplomatic jargon as an ‘explanation of vote’).
The explanation of the vote against by the delegate from the Czech Republic shows how a State presents as its own arguments that in reality reappear in the explanations of vote of other States, the United States being one that has used them.
The justification for Costa Rica’s vote, on the other hand, appeared later in an official communiqué posted by the Costa Rican diplomatic apparatus, invoking commercial reasons. How … like that? Well, … as you can see: see our published note on the subject, in its section “Some brief comments regarding the ‘justification’ officially provided by the Costa Rican diplomacy” (Note 2). In order not to cause further embarrassment to that already caused in these first days of the year 2025, we will avoid reproducing these annotations, available in the reading referenced in the aforementioned note.
Also, for our Costa Rican readers, it should be remembered that the advisory opinion issued on July 19, 2024, by the ICJ resulted from a vote taken in the last days of 2022 at the United Nations General Assembly. On that occasion, Costa Rica was recorded as voting against, together with Guatemala in Latin America (Note 3). On that occasion, the Costa Rican delegation did not consider it appropriate to explain its vote against to the other delegations present in New York. Thus the embarrassment of September 2024 can be related to the blush of December 2022.
The Costa Rican delegation’s technique of silence does not appear to be the monopoly of its diplomats in New York alone: it was also observed in April 2024 by the Costa Rican delegation in Geneva, when it abstained in a vote of the Human Rights Council urgently calling for an arms embargo on Israel (see article dated April 5, 2024, from the digital media Delfino.cr).
Blushing, going through a feeling of deep unease between the two of them, is what this sequence leaves us with, not to mention a multitude of very valid questions.
b) Some recent announcements from Costa Rica in the last months of 2024
Shortly after the first anniversary of October 7, 2023, Costa Rica announced the resumption of its negotiations with Israel with a view to adopting a free trade agreement (see news item on the radio program Amelia Rueda from October 18, 2024).
Remember that Israel already signed a similar treaty with Panama in May 2018 (see official note) and it is very possible that it will be on the agenda with El Salvador (see official statement of 2022). On October 24, 2024, the appointment of the new Costa Rican ambassador to Israel was made official (see official letter from the Presidential House).
Recently, Costa Rica, for some reason, saw fit to negotiate a bilateral environmental agreement with the current Israeli authorities and … announce it in the middle of a world summit: indeed, during the recent COP29 held in Baku, Azerbaijan, Costa Rica surprised many by announcing the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Israel on environmental matters (see official statement from its counterparts in Israel). In reaction, Costa Rica obtained the undignified award of “Fossil of the Day” given by outraged international environmental organizations (see article published in the weekly Ojoalclima, the final part of which exposes the Costa Rican authorities in their sudden refusal to give explanations).
On January 31, 2025, the UCR hosted a conference with the Palestinian representative to the United Nations in person (see link to his conference and photo posted on social networks), apparently without any official statement being released. Once again, the only Costa Rican media outlet to interview Ambassador Riyad Mansour was the UCR’s Semanario Universidad (see the full interview was published on their website on February 5, 2025). On February 9, another
The Belize application in brief
In its request for an intervention (see text) sent on January 30, 2025 to the ICJ, Belize proceeds to detail some arguments regarding the interpretation of the main provisions of the convention against genocide. In particular, after a long sequence of reports and data, it reads:
61. Although this standard is high, the Court has endorsed a “notion of ‘reasonableness’” in the exercise of inferring intent, mindful to avoid a situation that “would make it impossible to reason conclusions by way of inference”. This notion of reasonableness is key to the Court’s evaluation of the evidence in a way that ensures unreasonable inferences are disregarded, but also that avoids the evidential standard for establishing genocidal intent being set unrealistically high.
62. The Court must assess the evidence comprehensively and holistically. This includes a consideration of contextual factors including the scale and severity of the genocidal and related acts carried out against the protected group. In this respect, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has stated that “absent direct evidence, the intent to destroy may be inferred from a number of facts and circumstances, such as the general context, the perpetration of other culpable acts systematically directed against the same group, the scale of atrocities committed, the systematic targeting of victims on account of their membership in a particular group, or the repetition of destructive and discriminatory acts“.
The points indicated here are only a small part of the document submitted by Belize to the judges of the ICJ in The Hague, and a full reading of the document is recommended: this is in the interest of better understanding the importance that these and other arguments may have on the judges’ reflection when making their decision on the merits.
A small group of states committed to international justice in Gaza
Belize thus joins similar requests submitted by several States to the ICJ, in support of South Africa’s claim, namely: Bolivia, Chile, Cuba, Colombia, Spain, Ireland, the Maldives, Nicaragua, Palestine, Turkey and Mexico. These are states that, observing the same heartbreaking images coming from Gaza day after day since the evening of October 7, 2023, have decided to support, beyond the announcements, the lawsuit filed by South Africa against Israel since December 30, 2023 before the international court in The Hague.
As indicated in the first lines of these reflections, legally, only States that are States Parties to the 1948 Genocide Convention (see
The last state before Belize to have presented a similar case before the judges of the ICJ was Cuba on January 10, preceded by Ireland on January 6, 2025: see see official ICJ communiqué in official statement), welcomed by experts and organizations from Irish civil society (see note from Irish Legal News). It should be remembered that Ireland (together with Slovenia, Spain and Norway) chose to recognize Palestine as a state in mid-2024 (see official statement of May 22, 2024). On July 19, 2024, Ireland welcomed the content of the ICJ advisory opinion on the illegality of Israel’s colonization and occupation of Palestinian territory (see text of 11 lines) and the absolute silence of Canada and the United States.
With this request for intervention from Belize, request for intervention number seven from the American continent is registered, after the one presented early in January 2024 by Cuba (January 2025).
Unlike the other requests, Nicaragua’s request is distinguished by the legal basis used, namely Article 62 of the ICJ Statute and not Article 63, paragraph 2 (Note 5).
Europe faced with the unspeakable drama in Gaza
Ireland’s request for intervention, which was filed on January 6, 2025, is the second request for intervention submitted by a European Union (EU) member state to the ICJ in support of South Africa’s lawsuit against Israel, after Spain, which did so on June 28, 2024, and which we had the opportunity to analyze (Note 6).
Considering that the EU is a regional organization with 27 member states whose foreign policy is based on human rights and the fight against impunity, as well as respect for international obligations derived from international instruments, the very small number of states supporting South Africa’s demand shows its inconsistency with the principles proclaimed in a multitude of international forums.
Incidentally, this inconsistency is reminiscent of the headline of this article from the November 2023 issue of Semanario Universidad about the reservation observed by Costa Rica (see article) to denounce the exactions committed by Israel in Gaza and which reads as follows: “Costa Rica is inconsistent in its position on Gaza, while the negotiation of an FTA with Israel is pending”.
Returning to Europe, this report on the quantification of the damage committed by Russia in Ukraine (see another to April 2024) should be able to apply its methodology and the same calculations to quantify exactly the damage caused by Israel in Gaza since the evening of October 7, 2023: however, it is likely that the World Bank will not be able to count on the EU to proceed with this quantification. The satellite images of UNOSAT detail the level of destruction in Gaza very precisely (see link to reports) in order to proceed with this quantification.
The same sense of incoherence emerges when reading, on the one hand, the EU’s supposed commitment to international criminal justice and to the International Criminal Court (ICC) (see official statement of July 17, 2024); and on the other hand, the fact that the States that have urgently referred a request (“referral”) to the ICC Prosecutor in the face of the drama unfolding in Gaza were initially Bangladesh, Bolivia, Comoros Islands, Djibouti and South Africa ( see official statement).
On January 9, 2025, Poland officially announced that it had taken all the necessary precautions so that the Prime Minister and his entourage could make their planned visit on January 27 without major complications, on the occasion of the commemoration of the liberation of the Auschwitz-Birkenau concentration camp (see article in the Washington Post). As is well known, Poland has ratified the 1998 Rome Statute and must comply with the international obligations arising from this instrument. These are obligations that France should also respect and yet its current Executive Power seems willing to ignore in the case of the Prime Minister of Israel (Note 7).
Also on January 9, 2025, the US Congress passed a law to sanction ICC staff for investigating and ordering the arrest of two Israeli leaders (see joint communiqué) gives an account of the opposition to such a maneuver by the US Congress. On January 23, 2025, it was the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute that condemned the intimidation of ICC officials by stating that (see official statement):
The Bureau emphasizes that the Assembly of States Parties stands firmly by the International Criminal Court, its elected officials, its personnel, and those cooperating with the Court. We stress the importance of the International Criminal Court in defending international justice and call on all States, international organizations and civil society to respect its independence and impartiality.
Regarding the ICC, it is worth noting that on January 13, 2025, the ICC Prosecutor replied to a brief submitted by Israel to the Appeals Chamber in December 2024, in an attempt to undermine the legal validity of the arrest warrants confirmed by the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber: in his reply (see written response), the ICC Prosecutor rejected one by one all the arguments presented by Israel asking for them to be dismissed. On January 22, 2025, the ICC Prosecutor once again responded to Israel in the face of yet another attempt at Israeli diplomacy (see document 2, both dated January 22, 2025, which quite forcefully reject the Israeli arguments): However, the intensity of Israel’s attempts at the ICC to challenge the arrest warrants against two of its top leaders (confirmed by the ICC in November 2024) may be related to the election result in the United States and respond to an agenda in which the United States will be seen to be accompanying Israel in its open challenge to the authority of international criminal justice. Nor should we rule out the possibility that the pressure exerted on ICC judges by Israel may, in some individual case, have an effect (with a statement or dissenting opinion from a member of the Appeals Chamber that partially accommodates Israel’s arguments).
Returning to the ICJ, it is worth noting that the holder of the Belgian diplomatic portfolio had announced her intention to make a request for intervention before the ICJ to support South Africa in March 2024, an announcement that had no effect (see TV5Monde news item of March 11, 2024). In a similar situation is an official announcement made by the Egyptian diplomatic service (see note from Reuters, May 2024).
Israel’s two new unwavering allies in Latin America
Beyond the aberrations to which the new administration in the United States since January 20, 2025, seems to want to accustom the world, the truth is that Argentina as well as Paraguay are, in recent times, replacing in the United Nations the small Pacific islands traditionally very attentive to Israel’s requests (Fiji Islands, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea and Tonga), forming for several years in the United Nations the only “coalition” to accompany Israel and the United States in this type of exercise within the United Nations.
When it comes to Argentina, it is worth recalling a rather unusual event observed at the United Nations, when the current Argentine authorities decided on October 30th to dismiss their top diplomat after she instructed her delegation at the United Nations to vote in favor of a draft resolution (see official statement from the United Nations). This same extreme solitude of the United States and Israel was observed in November 2023, with 187 votes in favor on that occasion (see official statement from the United Nations).
Note that on December 12, 2024, Paraguay moved its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, in open violation of the consensus that has existed within the international community since the 1960s: see news item from La Nación (Argentina). In September 2018, we had the opportunity to analyze the few months that the Guarani embassy remained in Jerusalem: three months in total to be exact (Note 8). It should be noted that the opening of the Paraguayan embassy in Jerusalem was registered on May 21, 2018, while the US embassy was inaugurated a week earlier, on May 14, 2018.
On January 3, 2025, a group of social organizations based in Uruguay strongly condemned the official announcement made by the country’s authorities on December 23, 2024 (see text).
By way of conclusion
Israel’s cruelty against the civilian population of Gaza since the evening of October 7, 2023, is observable by all members of the international community. However, not all states seem willing to activate the existing jurisdictional mechanisms at their disposal in order to force Israel to answer for its actions before international justice.
Despite this, we recently had the opportunity to explain how the net of international justice (and also national justice in the case of some States) is slowly closing in on Israel, on its top authorities and on some of its soldiers who for some reason are traveling as tourists in Latin America after having committed war crimes in Gaza (Note 9).
From a renowned university in Belgium, this interesting compendium of the official positions of the Member States in the United Nations expressed between October 7, 2023 and January 15, 2025 (see document) gives an idea of the profound isolation of the United States and Israel within the international community.
Within the framework of another ICJ procedure, the advisory procedure, the ICJ concluded 2024 with an ICJ ordinance to process the request for an advisory opinion from the United Nations General Assembly, initially devised by Norway, which we also had the opportunity to analyze in terms of its scope and its prospects (Note 10): this time, Costa Rica positioned itself in favor of the initiative when the request for an advisory opinion was put to the vote at the United Nations General Assembly.
Finally, it is worth noting that on January 31, 2025, the The Hague Group made up of nine States (of which five are from the American continent) determined to enforce the decisions against Israel handed down by jurisdictional bodies, given the inability of some and the outrageous apathy of many others to enforce them. In this regard, the official communiqué from Bolivia can be consulted. In the first communiqué from this group (in which no European state is registered at the moment), it is stated that the delegations from these nine states:
Declare our intention to:
1. Uphold the UN Resolution A/RES/Es-10/24 and, in the case of States Parties, support the requests of the International Criminal Court comply with our obligations under the Rome Statute, with regards to the warrants issued on 21 November 2024; and implement the provisional measures of the International Court of Justice, issued on 26 January, 28 March, and 24 May 2024.
2. Prevent provision or transfer of arms, munitions and related equipment to Israel, in all cases where there is a clear risk that such arms and related items might be used to commit or facilitate violations of humanitarian law, international human rights law, or the prohibition on genocide, in compliance with our international obligations and consistent with the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion of 19 July 2024 and the UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/Es-10/24.
3. Prevent the docking of vessels at any port, if applicable, within our territorial jurisdiction, in all cases where there is a clear risk of the vessel being used to carry military fuel and weaponry to Israel, which might be used to commit or facilitate violations of humanitarian law, of international human rights law, and of the prohibition on genocide in Palestine, in keeping with states’ peremptory legal obligation to cooperate towards preventing genocide and other violations of peremptory norms by all legal measures at their disposal”.
This is a very recent initiative, open to other states and which will probably integrate new members in order to uphold the rules of the international legal system in the face of the defiant attitude of Israel and that of its unconditional US ally. It is probable that the establishment of this group is a response to the very pro-Israel stance taken by the new US president since he officially took office in the White House on January 20th.
– Notes –
Note 1: See Boeglin, N., “Gaza/Israel: Regarding the North American Maneuvers and the Recent Resolution S/RES/2720(2023) of the United Nations Security Council,” December 22, 2023. Text available here.
Note 2: See BOEGLIN N., “Gaza/Israel: Regarding Bolivia’s Recent Request for Intervention before the ICJ”, October 9, 2024 edition. Text available here.
Note 3: It should be remembered that the aforementioned advisory opinion of the ICJ of July 19, 2024, is the result of a process that began at the end of 2022, during which Costa Rica voted against it with Guatemala, without giving further explanations for such an unusual position of the Costa Rican delegation to the United Nations: see in this regard BOEGLIN N., “América Latina ante la solicitud de opinión consultiva a la justicia internacional sobre la situación en Palestina”, Portal de la UCR, February 13, 2023 edition, and , “América Latina ante la solicitud de opinión consultiva a la justicia internacional sobre la situación en Palestina”, Portal de la UCR, February 13, 2023 edition, and in particular the section “El voto de los Estados de América Latina en este 2022: Guatemala y Costa Rica únicos en votar en contra”. Text available here.
Note 5: The specificity of Nicaragua in its request for intervention filed on January 23, 2024 (see text in French and in Spanish) org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20240123-int-01-00-fr.pdf“>French and English) is as follows: while Ireland, like other States, invokes Article 63(2) of the ICJ Statute (see text), which allows any State party to a convention to intervene when it comes to interpreting the scope of its provisions, Nicaragua (as well as Palestine) has invoked Article 62. Nicaragua’s position (see the text of its request for intervention in French and in English) seeks to take to its ultimate consequences the idea that the prohibition of genocide is a peremptory norm of public international law (also called a ”rule of ius cogens” according to Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties): all States should, logically, have a legal interest in ensuring that this prohibition is respected and that the obligation to prevent genocide is considered a peremptory norm of obligatory compliance for all States. A rereading of Nicaragua’s request based on this element allows for a better understanding of the numerous references made to this specific category of public international law norms, rarely invoked before the judges of the ICJ.
Note 5: The specificity of Nicaragua in its request for intervention filed on January 23, 2024 (see text in French and in Spanish) org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20240123-int-01-00-fr.pdf“>French and English) is as follows: while Ireland, like other States, invokes Article 63(2) of the ICJ Statute (see text), which allows any State party to a convention to intervene when it comes to interpreting the scope of its provisions, Nicaragua (as well as Palestine) has invoked Article 62. Nicaragua’s position (see the text of its request for intervention in French and in English) seeks to take to its ultimate consequences the idea that the prohibition of genocide is a peremptory norm of public international law (also called a ”rule of ius cogens” according to Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties): all States should, logically, have a legal interest in ensuring that this prohibition is respected and that the obligation to prevent genocide is considered a peremptory norm of obligatory compliance for all States. A rereading of Nicaragua’s request based on this element allows for a better understanding of the numerous references made to this specific category of public international law norms, rarely invoked before the judges of the ICJ.
Note 6: See BOEGLIN N., “Gaza / Israel: some notes on the request for intervention presented by Spain before the International Court of Justice (ICJ)”, July 3, 2024. Text available here.
Note 7: Regarding the arrest warrants confirmed by the ICC against two Israeli leaders and a Hamas military commander, France issued an extremely questionable official statement: see in this regard MAISON R., “France, l’amitié avec Israël comme excuse de la violation du droit international”, Oriente XXI, December 19, 2024 edition. Text available here. In a nota que editamos a destinación del público de habla francesa sobre las órdenes de arresto confirmadas por la CPI el pasado 21 de noviembre, y titulada ‘Gaza / Israël : la portée des mandats d’arrêt délivrés récemment par la Cour Pénale Internationale (CPI) et la surprenante réaction officielle de la France’ nos permitimos explicar que: “This line of case law applied to visits by foreign heads of state to France merits a slightly less legal explanation, which we will attempt to provide: you can shake hands with any foreign head of state on the steps of the Elysée, add the obligatory hugs, affable smiles and poses in front of journalists, and that head of state benefits from the immunity granted to any head of state on French territory. This is the case even if he is suspected of committing genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity or other serious violations of human rights. To the question that anyone can legitimately ask, “But… there are many of these foreign heads of state”, the answer is that there are indeed a good number of them. On the other hand, and in this case the number is much smaller, when these accusations have been carefully examined and meticulously documented by the ICC Prosecutor, then methodically reviewed by three ICC judges, and this foreign head of state is finally the subject of an arrest warrant issued by a Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC, international law automatically applies to the French authorities under the Rome Statute: the same Head of State is then captured by the competent national authorities if he is in France, and he is promptly handed over to the ICC judges in The Hague. No more hugging in front of the cameras.
Note 8: Regarding the decision to move the embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem by the then President Cartes in Paraguay in May 2018 (under strong pressure from the United States for Paraguay to join the United States with embassies in Jerusalem) and then the decision of the new Paraguayan President Mario Abdo Benitez to return it without further ado to Tel Aviv a few months later, see BOEGLIN N., “ La valiente decisión de Paraguay de restablecer su Embajada en Tel Aviv: una breve puesta en perspectiva”, published on September 11, 2018. Text available here.
Note 9: See Boeglin N., “Gaza/Israel: some notes from Costa Rica regarding the siege of justice that is gradually closing”, January 3, 2025. Text available here.
Note 10: See BOEGLIN N., “Gaza / Israel: the recent order of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the context of the request for an advisory opinion”, December 26, 2024. Text available here.
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